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Abstract 
This study employs a natural experiment to examine the tax effects of a change in the level of conformity 
between tax and financial reporting in China for firms with different financial reporting incentives. We find 
that in a full book-tax conformity system, firms with incentives to report higher book income pay significantly 
higher income tax (per dollar of sales) than do firms without the same incentives. Although we do not find 
similar evidence in a non-conformed system, we observe cross-sectional variation in taxes paid by firms of 
varying sizes: by exploiting non-conforming financial reporting rules to a greater extent, large firms pay 
proportionately lower taxes than do small firms. To improve financial reporting quality, many countries have 
adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that may affect book-tax reporting differences. 
Our results suggest that this policy alternative is less desirable from a tax perspective. Therefore, accounting 
standard setters and securities regulators around the world should consider not only how such a change is 
intended to benefit capital markets, but also what unintended consequences this policy choice might have for 
government revenue. Our results also strengthen the government policy position on giving more tax relief to 
small firms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Enron-era wave of corporate accounting scandals and aggressive tax reporting in the U.S. has 
led to a policy debate on whether there should be a greater degree of conformity between financial 
accounting (book) income and taxable income. From the tax reporting perspective, some argue that 
such conformity would force firms to make a book-tax trade-off, thereby inducing those with 
incentives to report higher book income to pay higher taxes (Desai 2005; Mills 1996; U.S. Department 
of the Treasury 1999; Yin 2001).1 However, few studies examine the tax effects of imposing book-tax 
conformity. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Shevlin (2007) call for further evidence on the costs 
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and benefits of conformity to help inform the current debate. To provide such additional evidence, 
this study employs a natural experiment in which firms experience a major change in financial 
reporting that weakens book-tax conformity in China. We find that when conformity is high, firms 
with high book incentives pay significantly more tax (per dollar of sales) than do firms with low 
book incentives. We also find that when conformity is low, large firms pay proportionately less tax 
than do small firms. 
 
To bring domestic accounting norms into harmony with international practices, China substantially 
relaxed the traditionally stringent linkage between tax and financial reporting for the first time in 
1998 (Chan et al. 2010). This change exogenously reduced the level of conformity between book and 
tax reporting by granting managers considerable discretion in their choice of accounting procedures. 
In the pre-1998 regime, as firms had to report conforming book income in most aspects, the extent 
to which they could opportunistically avoid tax was constrained. For example, if firms understated 
their taxable income, they generally had to report lower book income; likewise, if they overstated 
book income, they generally had to pay higher taxes. In the post-1998 regime, firms have more 
freedom to make separate determinations on the appropriate amount of income for book and tax 
purposes. In such circumstances, some firms may be able to overstate book income by exploiting 
non-conforming reporting rules in ways that exert little or no tax effect (or to understate taxable 
income without having to understate book income). 
 
We identify a unique set of firms that experienced such a financial reporting change in China to 
examine how such a change in financial reporting affects the tax reporting behavior of firms with 
different book incentives. We discriminate between high and low book incentive firms according to 
whether they face regulatory pressure to meet earnings targets. As explained in more detail later in 
this paper, Chinese regulations generally require firms to report a minimum return on equity (ROE) 
in each of the previous three years before they can apply to launch a rights offering. Extant studies 
suggest that China's accounting-based regulation of rights offering creates strong incentives for 
earnings management (Chen et al. 2008; Chen and Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005). Therefore, we label 
the rights offering applicants as high book incentive firms and other firms as low book incentive 
firms. We compare the ratios of tax expense to sales of high book incentive firms with those of low 
book incentive firms in the pre- and post-1998 periods.2 Our results suggest that after controlling for 
firm profitability, pre-1998 firms with incentives to report higher book income were compelled to 
match taxable income to book income and thus paid more tax. However, we find little evidence of 
high book incentive firms paying more tax than low book incentive firms in the post-1998 period. 
These results suggest that when the two measures of income are aligned, firms are willing to 
respond to earnings pressure without having regard for the tax consequences. We also find that 
when confronted with pressure to meet earnings targets, large firms pay proportionately less 
income tax than do small firms in the post-1998 period. Overall, our results suggest that cross-
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sectional variation in corporate tax reporting behavior is a direct result of a change in the required 
level of conformity. 
 
Book-tax conformity can be affected by changes in financial and/or tax reporting rules. Numerous 
studies have used the setting provided by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to examine the effect of tax 
law changes on corporate financial reporting behavior in the U.S. (e.g., Guenther 1994; Guenther et 
al. 1997; Lopez et al. 1998; Maydew 1997; Scholes et al. 1992).3 However, research that directly 
examines the tax effects of changes in financial reporting is limited. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
suggest that the ideal research design to examine this issue is to compare corporate reporting 
behavior before and after such a change (e.g., from a non-conformed system to a highly conformed 
system, or vice versa). Our study capitalizes on an opportune setting in which Chinese firms 
experienced changes in financial reporting rules that reduce book-tax conformity. 
 
Our study complements that of Chan et al. (2010), but differs in a number of respects. First, to 
examine the tax effect of changes in financial reporting obligations, Chan et al. (2010) use 
discrepancies between the amount of tax assessed by the tax authorities and the amount reported in 
the return as their measure of tax compliance, whereas we use the income tax expense reported in 
the firm's financial statements.4 Tax non-compliance is one of the more aggressive tax-planning 
strategies and implies that the firm has committed tax law violations; however, paying a lower 
amount of tax does not necessarily imply that the firm has done something improper, because the 
reduction may result from grey-area interpretations of tax law. Therefore, in comparison with Chan 
et al. (2010), who focus on tax compliance, we examine a more general case of tax reporting.5 Another 
desirable attribute of our setting is the availability of public data on financial statement-based tax 
expenses; these data allow us to examine a broad sample of firms (rather than limiting the 
investigation to a subset of firms selected for tax audits). This provides us with a more representative 
sample and ultimately increases the external validity of this study. Furthermore, while Chan et al. 
(2010) focus on between-period differences in tax non-compliance, we make within-period comparisons 
of the firm's reported tax expenses. In sum, these design features enable us to examine a more 
general case of corporate tax reporting across the universe of Chinese listed companies and provide 
corroborating evidence on the importance of understanding the tax consequences of a change in 
financial reporting rules. 
 
The relationship between firm size and taxes has implications for the formation of tax policy. Most 
prior studies examine this relation for a given level of book-tax conformity, or assume equal 
opportunity for tax planning across different conformity levels. As a result, the literature documents 
mixed results on this issue. In this study, we hypothesize and find that the strength and direction of 
the size effect are conditional on reporting incentives and the extent to which managers can exercise 
their discretion in financial reporting vis-à-vis tax reporting. Our results help explain why prior 
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research inconclusively demonstrates that firm size has both positive and negative effects on taxes 
paid. 
 
The tax effect of a change in financial reporting is an important but relatively under-researched issue. 
While increasing book-tax conformity may cause a decline in financial reporting quality (Atwood et 
al. 2010; Hanlon et al. 2005, 2008), our results are consistent with the claim that imposing conformity 
to increase the book-tax trade-off can induce higher tax payments from firms with incentives to 
report higher book income (Desai 2005; Mills 1996; Yin 2001). Erickson et al. (2004) find that some 
firms are willing to pay additional taxes to bring taxable income in line with the inflated book 
income. In our context, these firms are the high incentive firms in the pre-1998 period. Our results 
are also consistent with those of Badertscher et al. (2009) and Frank et al. (2009), who find that when 
tax and financial reporting need not conform, some firms are able to manipulate both income 
measures to achieve the optimal reporting outcome: reporting high book income to the financial 
markets and low taxable income to the tax authority. In the setting we examine, these firms are the 
large, high incentive firms in the post-1998 period. 
 
The fact that China is not alone in attempting to move away from a tax-based accounting system 
suggests that our results are informative to international accounting standard setters and accounting 
regulators from around the world, who are facing an evolution in financial reporting practices 
similar to that taking place in China. According to Tweedie (2011), over 100 countries require or 
permit the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).6 The adoption of IFRS will 
evidently cause financial reporting to diverge further from tax reporting. Our results show that this 
divergence allows certain firms to achieve the best of both worlds: to manage accounting earnings 
upward while managing tax earnings downward, which is undesirable from a tax policy perspective. 
This suggests that accounting standard setters and regulators should not consider the influence of a 
regulatory change from the financial reporting perspective alone. We recommend that public firms 
be required to disclose reconciliations of significant book-tax income differences as one way to 
counterbalance managerial reporting opportunism. This is an important regulatory requirement, 
particularly in emerging markets where tax enforcement and expertise in tax administration are 
generally weak (Lin 2006). The fact that corporate tax is generally a major source of government 
revenue adds weight to this disclosure recommendation. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the evolution of 
financial and tax reporting in China to facilitate the development of our hypotheses. We describe 
the sample selection process and the regression models in Section III. We then present the univariate 
and multivariate results in Section IV. Section V summarizes our findings. 
  
This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Journal of International Accounting Research 12:2 (2013); doi: 10.2308/jiar-50404 
ISSN 1542-6297 (Print) / 1558-8025 (Online)  
Copyright © American Accounting Association. Published online: Jan 2013
5 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
 
Changes in Financial Reporting 
Under the old economic system, China's economy was dominated by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). All profits earned by the SOEs were remitted to the state, and any losses were covered by 
the government. All major expenditures were processed through a highly centralized fund 
allocation scheme. In such a command economy, the main role of accounting was simply to assist 
the government in planning and allocating economic resources. 
 
Significant changes have taken place since China began implementing its “open-door” economic 
policy in 1978. The privatization of SOEs, converting them into limited liability firms, has 
significantly diversified the ownership structure in China and fundamentally changed the role of 
financial reporting. In response to the developing market economy, the Chinese government 
published the Accounting Regulation for Experimental Listed Companies in 1992. This represented the 
government's first attempt at a conceptual level to transform China's traditionally rigid and uniform 
accounting system into an Anglo-Saxon form of financial reporting (Davidson et al. 1996). However, 
the 1992 accounting regulation still exerted a strong tax influence on financial reporting. For 
example, the regulation required firms to select depreciation methods, estimate fixed asset residual 
value and useful life, and make doubtful account provisions strictly in accordance with tax and fiscal 
regulations. 
 
As a result of firms being motivated by their own objectives and external pressure to harmonize 
accounting standards, China issued the Accounting Regulation for Listed Companies in 1998. This 
regulation gave firms the freedom to determine the useful lives of their assets and the depreciation 
methods they adopted based on underlying business conditions, and allowed for several asset 
classes to be valued other than at historical cost for financial reporting purposes. Officially regarded 
by the Chinese government as aligned with international accounting norms, the regulation 
represented an important determination to move away from the traditional tax-based reporting 
regime toward the adoption of international accounting standards (PRC Ministry of Finance 1998; 
Chan et al. 2010). In short, the new reporting regime allowed firms more discretion in making 
accounting choices in comparison with the old regime, and gave them greater flexibility in how they 
determined appropriate figures for book and tax reporting purposes. 
 
Corporate Tax Reporting 
In response to the enterprise reform, China implemented two major revisions to its tax system in 
1994 and 2008. The 1994 tax reform brought an end to the application of different tax rates among 
domestic enterprises of varying sizes by introducing a flat rate of 33 percent for all firms. Although 
the statutory rate was the same for both domestic and foreign invested enterprises, the effective tax 
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rate for the former was generally higher than that for the latter due to the unavailability of tax 
concessions. In March 2007, the government leveled the playing field for all (domestic and foreign) 
enterprises by unifying the tax rate at 25 percent, effective January 1, 2008. 
 
There are two income tax accounting methods available for financial reporting purposes in China 
(Yang and Yang 1998). Under the tax payable method, the income tax expense for the current period 
is equal to income tax payable for the same period. Income tax payable is taxable income multiplied 
by the applicable tax rate. Because the income tax effects of timing differences are ignored, there is 
no deferred tax. Under the tax effect method, income tax is considered an expense incurred in 
earning income, and is recognized in the same period as are the revenue and expenses to which it 
relates. The income tax effects of timing differences are recognized through deferred taxes. Prior to 
2007, firms could choose between the tax payable and tax effect accounting methods, and the vast 
majority of firms adopted the former. However, the new accounting standards prohibited firms 
from using the tax payable method, and required listed firms to follow the tax effect accounting 
method, effective January 1, 2007. 
 
Corporate Earnings Management 
The Chinese government established the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early 1990s 
to move from a government-funded SOE model to a market-driven SOE financing mechanism. 
These markets have since experienced tremendous growth. In less than 20 years, China overtook 
Japan to become Asia's largest stock market by value. Given China's status as a transition economy, 
the government constantly controls the growth of the market by setting the annual amount of equity 
the two stock exchanges can raise. The central government allocates each year's quota among local 
governments and ministries, which in turn make allocations to better-performing firms selected 
from their jurisdictions. 
 
Due to the severe shortage of capital available to fund growth, most firms in China lobby and 
compete for permission to launch an initial public offering. Many also seek to raise additional capital 
through a rights issue after going public (Chen and Yuan 2004). To curb the excess demand for 
equity financing and maintain the quality of rights offerings, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission has issued a series of guidelines over the years. The most rigid guideline is the 
requirement for firms to make a minimum ROE. For example, from 1996 to 1998, firms were required 
to achieve a minimum ROE of 10 percent in each of the three years prior to the rights offering. From 
1999 to 2000, the requirement was tightened to a three-year average ROE (before extraordinary gains) 
of at least 10 percent and a minimum of 6 percent in each of the previous three years. This rigid 
accounting-based regulation was initially intended to guide the flow of capital toward more efficient 
sectors of the economy; however, in practice it has motivated firms to manage earnings upward to 
circumvent the rights offering rules (Chen et al. 2001; Chen and Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005). 
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Research Hypotheses 
Chinese firms have incentives to report high book income to meet the threshold requirements for 
rights offerings and to report low taxable income to enhance cash flows. When the two measures of 
income conform to each other, there is a limit to how much tax firms can opportunistically avoid. 
This is because if firms engage in aggressive tax planning (in response to tax incentives), they will 
have to report lower book income. Moreover, if they engage in upward earnings management (in 
response to book incentives), they will have to pay more tax. These two incentives are largely 
mutually exclusive in a book-tax conformity setting. Stein (1989) suggests that firms that face greater 
capital market pressure attach more importance to book incentives and sacrifice managerial efforts 
related to tax incentives. This is consistent with evidence in the literature demonstrating that firms 
with financial reporting constraints are generally willing to forgo tax savings to avoid reporting 
lower book income (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). Erickson et al. (2004) find that some firms are 
even willing to pay a substantial amount of additional tax on their overstated earnings. 
 
When the two income measures are detached from each other, managers no longer face the same 
book-tax trade-off. In other words, the dual reporting of income and, most importantly, increased 
managerial discretion over accounting method choice allow managers to exploit non-conforming 
rules to manage book income upward and taxable income downward simultaneously (Frank et al. 
2009).7 This is consistent with evidence from the U.S. that many large public firms structure their 
transactions to reduce the amount of tax paid without reporting corresponding decreases in pre-tax 
book income (Badertscher et al. 2009; Frank et al. 2009; Plesko 2003). 
 
Based on the above discussion, our cross-sectional tests of high versus low book incentive firms 
before and after 1998 reflect the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  In the pre-1998 period, firms with high book incentives pay more tax per dollar of sales 
than do firms with low book incentives. In contrast, in the post-1998 period, there is no 
significant difference in tax paid between these two groups of firms. 
 
While many studies have examined the general effect of firm size on taxes, they have not explored 
this effect in settings of high versus low book-tax conformity. Our next hypothesis examines 
whether large and small firms operating in a regime that allows for more financial reporting 
discretion differ in their ability to avoid tax. The literature provides two theories to explain the firm 
size effect on tax payments. Political power theory holds that large firms pay less income tax than 
small firms because large firms have more resources available to (1) influence the political process 
in their favor, (2) develop expertise in tax planning, and (3) structure complex transactions to 
minimize tax liabilities (Scholes et al. 1992; Siegfried 1972). Conversely, political cost theory argues 
that larger firms bear higher political costs because they face more public and government scrutiny 
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(Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zimmerman 1983). As tax avoidance is an element of political cost, 
larger firms tend to pay more taxes than smaller firms. 
 
Empirical evidence on the size-to-tax effect is also inconclusive.8 The equivocal nature of evidence 
on this effect may be attributable to the failure of prior studies to control for tax-planning 
opportunities in different book-tax conformity settings. Mills (1996) suggests that although tax law 
complexity creates additional compliance costs, it also provides opportunities for tax planning. 
Chan et al. (2010) also propose that a tax regime that requires a lower degree of conformity between 
book and tax reporting creates more opportunities for tax non-compliance. As discussed earlier, in 
the pre-1998 period, China's financial reporting rules had little “grey area” for managers to exploit. 
The post-1998 regime is more complicated than its predecessor, as there are more book-tax 
reconciliation items and non-conforming rules. Consequently, managers have a greater opportunity 
to report different book and tax income figures. We also expect that whether managers take 
advantage of this opportunity depends on firm reporting incentives and the resources available for 
tax planning. 
 
Therefore, despite the unresolved empirical question over the size-tax relation and our expectation 
of no significant difference overall in taxes paid between high and low incentive firms in the post-
1998 period (H1), among firms with high financial reporting incentives, we expect larger firms (with 
more resources) to be able to exploit opportunities afforded by tax law complexity and financial 
reporting rules flexibility to a greater extent in the post-1998 period. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Where there are incentives to meet clear earnings targets, large firms pay less income tax 
per dollar of sales than do small firms in the post-1998 period. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
As the change made to China's financial reporting regime in 1998 was significant, we use 1998 as 
the focal point around which we expect to see a significant change in corporate tax reporting 
behavior. We treat 1998 as a transition year, because elements of the 1998 regulation became 
mandatory in 1999. To construct equally long panels covering the two reporting regimes, we use 
1995–1997 and 1999–2001 as our two sample periods.9 There were no major changes in tax legislation 
in China during these periods. Our first sample period starts in 1995 because this was the year 
immediately following the 1994 tax reform and the income tax rate remained constant during the 
period (i.e., there was no tax rate-based incentive to manage earnings). For both periods, we 
partition our sample firms into high and low book incentive firms. As noted earlier, regulations 
require rights-offering firms to report a minimum level of ROE in each of the three years before the 
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offering. Prior research finds that firms boost accounting earnings in anticipation of a rights offering 
(Chen et al. 2008; Chen and Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005).10 Reporting higher earnings also helps firms 
set a good offering price. Therefore, we define rights offering applicants as high book incentive firms; 
in comparison with such firms, low book incentive firms face less pressure to maintain income 
levels.11 Descriptive statistics indicate that our partitions successfully capture the differential book 
incentive levels among firms. For example, the average ROE for high book incentive firms is 15.4 
percent in the pre-1998 period, significantly higher than the 7.2 percent for low book incentive firms. 
A similar difference is evident in the post-1998 period. 
 
We begin with 3,615 firm-year observations drawn from the Wind Information database, which 
contains a complete set of data enabling us to compute each variable for the two sample periods. 
This database covers stock and bond data for all listed Chinese firms, including historical and real-
time market data, financial statements, and information on rights offerings, ownership structure, 
and corporate actions. We exclude 72 firm-year observations that represent financial institutions (as 
they use different accounting rules). We also exclude 405 firm-year observations that show zero tax 
expense due to the firm reporting an operating loss.12 Therefore, our final sample comprises 3,138 
firm-year observations (1,152 pre-1998 and 1,986 post-1998). These observations represent 993 firms 
(or 85 percent of the population by 2001), 454 (46 percent) of which applied for permission to conduct 
a rights offering during the sample period. Table 1 presents the sample distribution and mean 
differences for firms with high versus low book incentives over the two sample periods.13 
 
Table 1 indicates that while post-1998 income tax expenses and sales have increased in absolute 
terms relative to those of the pre-1998 period, the average rate of tax per dollar of sales has remained 
stable over time. For our sample of pre-1998 firms, we find that firms with high book incentives on 
average report a much higher pre-tax profit margin (0.191 versus 0.115, t = 3.630, p < 0.01) and a 
significantly higher tax-to-sales ratio (0.028 versus 0.020, t = 5.245, p < 0.01) than do firms with low 
book incentives.14 We interpret this evidence as indicating that high book incentive firms manage 
book income upward to meet earnings targets, but also report additional income for tax purposes. 
For our post-1998 firms, we find that while high book incentive firms on average report a 
significantly higher pre-tax profit margin (0.137 versus 0.123, t = 2.382, p < 0.01) than do low book 
incentive firms, the two groups report a virtually identical rate of tax per dollar of sales (0.026 versus 
0.025, t = 0.727, p = 0.23).15 The differential effects of profit margin on tax expense suggest that our 
results are not driven by differences in profitability across high and low book incentive firms, but 
are caused by differences in opportunities available for non-conforming earnings management 
across book-tax conformity levels. 
 
Other statistics indicate that firms with high (relative to low) book incentives are smaller in scale, 
have lower levels of government and foreign ownership, and experience higher rates of growth. In 
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unreported results, the majority of our sample firms operate in the manufacturing industry (56 
percent), followed by the wholesale and retail sectors (9 percent), conglomerates (8 percent), 
information technology (6 percent), real estate (5 percent), and utilities (4 percent). 
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Statistical Models 
To test the first hypothesis, we develop the following OLS regression model for all firm-year 
observations: 
 
 
where the dependent variable TAXEXP is the firm's annual tax expense deflated by sales revenue.16 
INCENTIVE takes a value of 1 if the firm applies for a rights issue in the following three years, and 
0 otherwise (Chan et al. 2010).17 This variable measures the difference in TAXEXP between high and 
low book incentive firms in the pre-1998 period (the first part of H1), and its coefficient (a1) is 
expected to be significantly positive. POST98equals 1 if the observation is in the post-1998 period. 
This variable measures the time trend in TAXEXP for low book incentive firms. The coefficient of 
INCENTIVE ∗ POST98 is the difference-in-difference estimate of changes in the relation between 
TAXEXP and INCENTIVE over time. If this relation is weaker after 1998 than it is before 1998, a3 will 
be negative. 
 
Nine firm-specific variables are included in the model to control for inter-firm differences in the 
book-tax trade-off. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm's year-end total assets. Because of the 
opposing arguments about the effect of firm size on taxes and the evidence supporting both views, 
we make no directional prediction regarding the overall effect of firm size. Given that rights-offering 
firms tend to be more profitable and profitable firms tend to pay more tax, our inferences about the 
tax effect are likely to be biased without a control for profitability. Therefore, we deflate pre-tax 
income by sales to control for the firm's profit margin.18 We expect PROFIT to be positively related 
to the amount of tax paid. LIQUIDITY is measured by the current ratio and is used to control for the 
effect of firm liquidity on tax planning. LEVERAGE (long-term debt scaled by total assets) is used as 
a proxy for the firm's capital structure.19 
 
Government ownership is an important characteristic of the Chinese economy. We use OWNER, the 
percentage of shares owned by the government, as a continuous variable to provide a general 
control for differences in the reporting incentives of government versus corporate-controlled firms 
(Wu et al. 2012). Given the opposing views on the effect of government ownership on taxes, we 
provide results on the differential effect of government ownership without making directional 
predictions regarding this variable.20 INTENSITY is capital intensity (fixed assets scaled by total 
assets), which measures how firms with different asset mixes are affected by different depreciation 
treatments for tax and book purposes. As depreciation on fixed assets is generally tax deductible, a 
greater weighting of fixed assets leads to a lower tax expense. GROWTH (the annual percentage 
increase in total assets) controls for firm growth effects. BSHARE is an indicator variable used to 
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control for the effect of foreign ownership on tax reporting.21 INDUSTRY is a set of dummy variables 
for the 11 sub-industry classifications that control for industry-specific effects. 
 
The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is constructed from the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation 
procedure to correct for sample selection bias.22 In the first stage, we estimate the probability of 
applying for a rights issue with a probit regression, where the binary variable is whether the firm 
applies for a rights issue. As reporting a profit with a clean audit opinion is an important condition 
for a rights offering, our choice of exclusion restriction is the type of audit opinion (clean report or 
modified audit report), an exogenous variable that has an effect on the binary variable in the first-
stage regression, but has no direct effect on the tax expense (i.e., the dependent variable) in the 
second stage.23 The control variables are SIZE, PROFIT, LIQUIDITY, LEVERAGE, OWNER, 
INTENSITY, GROWTH, BSHARE, and INDUSTRY, as defined earlier. In the second stage, we 
incorporate the IMR calculated in the first stage into the tax expense estimation model to take 
account of selectivity effects in testing the first hypothesis. 
 
To test the second hypothesis, we develop the following OLS regression model for the full period. 
To keep the set of earnings management motivations as homogenous as possible, we split our 
sample firms into two partitions—firms with high and low incentives to meet clear earnings 
targets.24 
 
 
where all variables are as defined previously. If large firms are more able than small firms to exploit 
non-conforming earnings management in the post-1998 period, then β3 should be negative. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 provides Pearson correlations among the variables used in the regression model for both the 
pre- and post-1998 periods.25 For the pre-1998 period (lower left), the Pearson correlation between 
TAXEXP and INCENTIVE is 0.153 (p < 0.01) and is highly significant, which is consistent with firms 
having incentives to report higher earnings also reporting higher tax expenses. In contrast, for the 
post-1998 period (upper right), the Pearson correlation between these two variables is 0.016 and 
insignificant (p = 0.23). Other correlations suggest that larger firms report lower liquidity and higher 
leverage, are more likely to be controlled by the government, and experience faster rates of growth 
compared to smaller firms. 
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Univariate and Multivariate Analyses 
Table 3 reports the results of the multivariate analysis for regression Equation (1) taking account of 
sample selection bias. Column 1 displays the results of a pooled regression, while columns 2 and 3 
show the parallel results of by-period regressions that mitigate the effect of any cross-sectional 
correlation in the regression error terms. The t-statistics are based on variance estimators adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and time-series dependence (clustering within the firm) in the panel data 
(Petersen 2008). 
 
 
The results based on the pooled analysis are consistent with those of the by-period analysis. The 
coefficient of INCENTIVE in column 1 indicates that after controlling for firm profitability, the pre-
1998 high book incentive firms report tax expenses higher than those of the low book incentive firms 
by an average of 0.5 percent of sales (in column 2, the INCENTIVE coefficient also shows a similar 
value). In terms of economic significance, given the mean sales value of RMB 659 million for high 
book incentive firms in the pre-1998 period, a 0.5 percent increase in the ratio roughly translates into 
a tax overpayment of RMB 3.3 million (approximately USD 0.53 million) for an average firm. 
Column 1 also shows that the coefficient on INCENTIVE drops from 0.005 (a1) before 1998 to 0.001 
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(a1 +a3) after, or a drop of 80 percent (= 0.004/0.005). Untabulated F-test results show that (a1 +a3) in 
the pooled regression is insignificant (F = 0.70, p = 0.404), consistent with the insignificant coefficient 
of INCENTIVE for the post-1998 regression (column 3). A Chow F-test also indicates that the two 
INCENTIVE coefficients (columns 2 and 3) are significantly different at the 1 percent level. These 
results suggest that upward earnings management is less costly (from a tax perspective) when the 
two income measures are detached from each other. 
 
The results for INCENTIVE are also consistent with our univariate comparison (Table 1, Panel A), 
which shows that the mean tax expense of the high incentive sample exceeds that of the low 
incentive sample by 0.8 percent of sales. While the inclusion of control variables in the multivariate 
analysis affects this difference to a small degree, the results continue to support H1 that firms with 
high book incentives pay more tax than firms with low incentives in the pre-1998 period. The 
difference in reported taxes between these two groups of firms is no longer significant in the post-
1998 period. These results support the proposition that a regime that strengthens book-tax 
conformity is likely to prompt higher tax payments for firms with incentives to maintain higher 
book income (Mills 1996). 
 
For the control variables that display consistent results over time, we find that firms with higher 
profit margins, liquidity levels, and government ownership tend to pay more income tax. Similar to 
prior studies, Table 3 shows an insignificant overall relation between taxes and firm size in both 
periods. As predicted, a good part of this relation is conditional on whether the firm has a large 
profit margin that makes tax planning worthwhile, and whether it has tax-planning expertise and 
opportunities. To examine this issue further, we sort all the sample firms in ascending order of profit 
margin by period and divide them into quartiles. We then define large (small) firms as firms with a 
natural logarithm of total assets above (below) the median value. Untabulated results show that 
when their profit margins are among the lowest (the first quartile), there is no difference in reported 
tax expenses between large and small firms in either period. When their profit margins are in the 
top quartile, large firms pay significantly less tax than small firms (0.040 versus 0.047), but only in 
the post-1998 period (t = 2.675, p < 0.01). 
 
We now perform a multivariate analysis to provide more convincing evidence on the size effect. To 
control for different book incentives across firms, we split our sample firms into two groups—firms 
with high and low incentives to meet clear earnings targets. For each subsample, we first run a 
pooled regression in which the coefficients of SIZE can vary across the two periods, then run by-
period regressions to provide parallel results. These results are reported in Table 4. 
 
Column 1 of Table 4 displays the results of the cross-period analysis, which are consistent with those 
of the within-period analysis reported in columns 2 and 3. The results show that the strength of the 
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size-tax relation differs between the two periods and between the two groups of firms with varying 
book incentives. As expected, the size effect is evident only in column 3 of Panel A, which shows 
that where there are incentives to meet earnings targets, large firms pay less income tax than small 
firms by an average of 0.2 percent of sales in the period when book-tax conformity is lower.26 This 
is consistent with prior research demonstrating that larger firms engage in more non-conforming 
earnings management than smaller firms (Badertscher et al. 2009). Panel B shows that SIZE has no 
significant effect on income tax when firms have no earnings pressure. Thus, our results reveal that 
the relation between taxes and firm size is conditional on the combination of three important factors 
affecting whether to engage in tax planning: whether opportunities are available (more non-
conforming reporting opportunities after 1998), whether incentives are present (firms with greater 
earnings pressure have greater incentives), and whether economies of scale exist (large firms have 
more resources with which to develop expertise and have more subsidiaries among which to shift 
income to minimize taxes). The relation between firm size and taxes has been the subject of 
longstanding debate in the literature. Our results suggest that it is difficult to fully understand the 
effect of size on taxes without considering managerial incentives and opportunities available for tax 
planning. 
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Among the control variables employed in both Tables 3 and 4, it appears that PROFIT and 
LIQUIDITY are the two that are relatively consistently significant across the period. Specifically, the 
results suggest that firms with higher profit margins and higher liquidity positions are positively 
associated with higher tax expenses. The results for other variables such as leverage and firm 
ownership are less consistent over time. 
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Supplementary Tests 
We base our main results on sales revenue as the deflator of tax expense. Our first two 
supplementary tests examine the robustness of this deflator. One commonly used measure of tax 
avoidance is the effective tax rate (ETR), which deflates the (current or total) income tax expense by 
pre-tax book income in the same period. However, the ETR does not directly capture conforming 
tax avoidance, because this measure uses book income as the denominator (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010). Nevertheless, we test whether our main results still hold if the tax expense is scaled by book 
income before extraordinary items.27Untabulated results suggest that pre-1998 scaled tax expenses 
are respectively 0.157 and 0.135 for high and low book incentive firms (t = 1.875, p = 0.03). However, 
there is no significant difference in the average rate of tax between high and low book incentive 
firms in the post-1998 period (t = −0.229, p = 0.41). We also deflate the tax expense by assets. Table 5 
(columns 1 and 2 in Panels A and C) reports the results of tests replicating the analysis shown in 
Tables 3 and 4 (for firms with high book incentives) using these two deflators.28 
 
Second, we test whether our main results are sensitive to alternative definitions of the explanatory 
variable. Chen and Yuan (2004) and Haw et al. (2005) find that China's accounting-based securities 
regulations have resulted in a cluster of firms reporting an ROE just above the regulatory benchmark 
for rights offerings. Therefore, we assign INCENTIVE the value of 1 if the firm applies for a rights 
issue and its reported ROE is between 10 and 12 percent before 1998 and 6 and 8 percent thereafter, 
and 0 otherwise (column 3). We also assign the value of 1 to INCENTIVE if the firm's pre-1998 ROE 
is between 10 and 12 percent and its post-1998 ROE is between 6 and 8 percent, and 0 otherwise, 
regardless of whether the firm applies for a rights offering (column 4). These alternative 
classifications help discriminate between firms that truly manage earnings and those that simply 
have strong performance.29 
 
Third, to explore the robustness of our results to potential serial correlation arising from repeated 
measures for the same firm across years, we use the firm-mean observations for each continuous 
variable. For example, we first identify the tax expense (scaled by sales) for each firm year before 
employing the mean value for each period as the sample value. We report the results in column 5. 
We then test whether our main results are robust to different sample compositions. Column 6 
reports an analysis focusing on observations that include a span of two years before and after the 
year of the policy change (i.e., 1996–1997 and 1999–2000), and column 7 shows results in which the 
1998–2000 period is treated as transitional by examining only the first (1995–1997) and last (2001–
2003) observations.30 
 
Overall, the tenor of our main results does not change. More importantly, after controlling for firm 
profitability and other factors expected to affect the dependent variable, the coefficients on 
INCENTIVE (Table 5, Panels A and B) in the pre-1998 period remain significantly positive in all 
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seven tests, consistent with H1. A Chow F-test also indicates that the pre-1998 and post-1998 
INCENTIVE coefficients are significantly different at the 1 percent level. Further, replication of the 
analysis in Table 4 (Panel A) indicates that SIZE is significantly negative only in the post-1998 period 
in all supplementary tests (Table 5, Panels C and D), reconfirming H2. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Recent corporate accounting scandals and aggressive tax reporting have led to a call for more 
explicitly conforming book and tax income measures to mitigate corporate incentives for 
opportunistic tax reporting. However, little hard evidence has been produced to support the 
proposition that conformity in book and tax reporting will indeed encourage honest tax reporting. 
This study draws from the unique and opportune setting of China to provide such evidence. 
Specifically, we hypothesize and find that a book-tax conformity system is likely to induce higher 
tax payments from firms with regulatory pressure to report higher book income. While we do not 
find similar results in a non-conformed system, we find that where incentives to meet earnings 
targets exist, large firms are more able than small firms to exploit non-conforming book income to a 
greater extent and thus save more tax. The results of this study should be of interest to academics 
and policymakers considering the benefits and costs of conforming the two income measures. For 
example, our results suggest that from the tax reporting viewpoint, upward earnings management 
is more costly where the two measures of income are more aligned. Furthermore, as small firms 
create opportunities for social and economic advancement in most countries and make important 
contributions to economic growth and employment over time, there has been a call for government 
to give the small business sector more tax relief. Our results showing that small firms pay 
proportionately more taxes than large firms strengthen the policy position on giving greater tax 
relief to small and medium-sized firms. On the other hand, our findings suggest that government 
should strengthen its scrutiny of large-firm financial statements in periods of lower book-tax 
conformity. 
 
This study is subject to several limitations, each of which provides a possible avenue for future 
inquiries. First, we use the reported tax expense to examine tax effects; to the extent abnormal tax 
expenses can be accurately estimated, future research could examine whether some firms pay 
abnormally higher or abnormally lower taxes than others. Second, consistent with prior research 
findings, we assume ex post that rights offering firms are earnings managers. Future research could 
explore the use of alternative measures to identify firms that “truly” manage earnings. Third, 
although we control for many factors expected to affect tax expenses, there may still be other 
variables that need to be controlled. Fourth, the generalizability of our results requires careful 
consideration of similarities and differences among countries. Fifth, while book-tax conformity 
reduces opportunistic tax management, future research may examine whether such conformity also 
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reduces opportunistic earnings management, and if so, the extent to which it does and how it affects 
earnings quality. 
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Notes 
 1 From the financial reporting perspective, some researchers provide evidence supporting their 
argument that reporting conformity reduces the quality of accounting information provided to the 
capital markets (e.g., Atwood et al. 2010; Hanlon et al. 2005, 2008). However, assessing the effect of 
an increase or decrease in conformity on earnings quality is beyond the scope of this study. 
 2 As explained later in the paper, we also find qualitatively similar results after scaling the tax 
expense by assets and pre-tax book income. 
 3 Overall, these studies find that changes in tax legislation cause firms to alter their financial 
reporting practices. Badertscher et al. (2009) examine the tax implications of conforming and non-
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conforming earnings management by firms that restate their financial statements. Unlike prior 
studies, we study the tax effects of a change in financial reporting rules. One desirable attribute of 
our setting is that because it includes a change in financial (not tax) reporting, we can isolate the tax 
reporting effect of changes in the tax code. 
 4 Arguably, data on such discrepancies reflect not only the reporting behavior of managers, but also 
the enforcement behavior of the tax authorities, whereas tax expense data mainly reflect corporate 
reporting behavior. 
 5 Income tax expense is a broad measure of tax burdens and reflects corporate tax-planning 
strategies. Prior studies have used tax expense as the focal point to examine earnings management 
and tax avoidance (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Dyreng et al. 2008; Rego 2003; Tang and Firth 2011). For 
example, to examine corporate reporting behavior in China, Tang and Firth (2011) measure book-
tax differences as the difference in income multiplied by the statutory tax rate. In essence, this 
difference refers to book-tax differences in tax expense. 
 6 These countries include Australia, Brazil, Canada, the 27 member states of the European Union, 
South Korea, and Mexico. Japan and the U.S. are the only G7 countries that continue to hold out on 
IFRS adoption. However, Japan has given domestic companies the option of preparing financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS. 
 7 For example, managers could choose different sales cutoff points for book and tax purposes, use 
different useful lives of assets for tax and financial reporting, shift from recognizing an asset as non-
depreciable to depreciable, expense an item for tax purposes but amortize it for book purposes, 
create tax losses without recording an equivalent charge against book income, use capital leases for 
book purposes but operating leases for tax purposes, omit taxable revenues already reported in their 
book accounts, and recognize prepaid expenses for tax purposes but adjust them for book purposes. 
While the list of possible examples is endless, these non-conforming actions could reduce taxable 
income without having a corresponding effect on book income. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) argue 
that if taxes remain constant as the firm manages earnings upward over the long run, then the firm 
is still avoiding taxes on its overstated book earnings. 
 8  For example, some studies find a negative relation (Chan et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2008; Porcano 
1986), some find a positive relation (Hanlon et al. 2007; Omer et al. 1993;Rego 2003; Zimmerman 
1983), and others find no relation (Gupta and Newberry 1997;Mills 1998; Phillips 2003). Wu et al. 
(2012) find that the relation depends on the firm's tax status and ownership in China. 
 9 As China gained accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, it took a further step to delink 
book and tax income measures and moved even closer to IFRS (Chan et al. 2010). As explained later 
in the paper, deleting the 2001 observations or extending the sample period to 2003 does not affect 
our main conclusions. China also revised its rights offering requirements in 1999, which might have 
encouraged firms to make greater efforts to manage earnings upward and thus to pay more tax. 
Therefore, this change in requirements will work against our hypothesis of no difference in tax 
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reporting between high and low book incentive firms in the post-1998 period (H1), and should have 
no impact on H2. 
10  As the regulation places an equal emphasis on each year's ROE, we expect firm earnings 
management incentives to be uniform over the three years. 
11  Although it is possible that some applicants are financially healthy and hence may not need to 
manage their earnings, healthy firms may still wish to boost their earnings to maximize the pricing 
of their rights issue. We deal with alternative definitions of financial reporting incentives later in the 
paper. It is also possible that some firms that do not apply for a rights offering may manage their 
earnings upward for other purposes (e.g., stock options and debt covenants); hence, including these 
firms in the low book incentive category may add noise to the results. However, as stock options are 
rare and leverage ratios are low in China during our sample periods, it is unlikely that earnings 
management for other purposes will affect our results. Nonetheless, as explained later in the paper, 
we use either the profit margin or the return on assets as an overall control for the firm's various 
financial reporting incentives. 
12  Chinese listed firms with two consecutive years of losses may have an incentive to manage 
earnings upward to avoid delisting. Further, firms can carry forward net operating losses for up to 
five years. However, the tax benefits of carrying a loss forward to a future year are less certain (in 
comparison with those of carrying back losses, which is not allowed in China). Mills and Newberry 
(2001) suggest that loss-making firms have fewer tax-related incentives to manage earnings. In line 
with effective tax rate studies, we delete all loss-making firms to avoid loss-related confounding 
effects on our results. 
13  Median values are not reported in Table 1 due to space limitations. The results of our tests of 
differences in means and medians are qualitatively similar. 
14  Changes in financial reporting rules may affect comparability of the ratio between periods. 
However, our focus in Table 1 is on a within-period comparison of the ratio across firms with varying 
book incentives. In an untabulated analysis, we find that the average rate of tax per dollar of income 
is also higher (0.157 versus 0.135, t = 1.875, p = 0.03). We also note that the two groups of firms exhibit 
no significant difference in their applicable tax rates, and are evenly spread over protected and 
unprotected industries and among coastal and inland regions subject to different tax rates. 
15  There is also no statistically significant difference between the two groups of firms in the average 
rate of tax per dollar of income (0.187 versus 0.191, t = −0.229, p = 0.41). Further, the two groups of 
firms do not differ in their applicable tax rates, nor are they concentrated in a particular industry 
(e.g., protected versus unprotected) or region (coastal versus inland) to which different tax rates 
apply. 
16  Adjusting for deferred tax does not affect our main results, as deferred tax is rare in our sample. 
Because Chinese firms were not required to disclose cash flow statements prior to 1998, we cannot 
use cash taxes paid. Nor do we base our main results on the effective tax rate (ETR), which deflates 
the tax expense by pre-tax book income, because the ETR is less effective in capturing conforming 
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tax avoidance for firms that place varying levels of importance on book income (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010). As sales are generally the basis of common-size income statement analysis, it is not 
uncommon to use sales as the deflator (Gauthier and Gersovitz 1997; La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 
1999; Mehran and Peristiani 2010). We deal with other deflator choices later in the paper. 
17  Although our sample does not cover 1998, 2002, or 2003, we also code this variable as 1 if the 
sample firm applies for a rights offering in any of these three years. We consider other definitions 
of INCENTIVE below. 
18  As a secondary test, we also scale pre-tax income by year-end total assets (i.e., the return on assets) 
and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
19  On the one hand, as interest on debt is tax deductible, one may expect firms with higher leverage 
to have a lower tax expense. On the other hand, leverage is a measure of the tightness of accounting-
based debt covenant restrictions. If highly levered firms have incentives to choose upward earnings 
management to satisfy their lenders, the association between leverage and tax expense will be 
positive. 
20  There are two views on whether firms benefit from the presence of government shareholders. The 
helping-hand view argues that firms with higher government ownership pay lower taxes because 
of their ability to receive government support and influence government policies in their favor. In 
contrast, the grabbing-hand view posits that government may expropriate firm wealth in the form 
of higher taxes to improve local welfare. Prior studies find mixed results regarding the relation 
between government and taxes (e.g.,Adhikari et al. 2006; Chan et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2012; Shevlin et 
al. 2012; Wu et al. 2012; Zeng 2010). 
21  Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges have A- and B-share markets. A-shares are 
denominated in renminbi and are open to investment by Chinese individuals. B-shares are 
denominated in foreign currency (U.S. dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen) 
and were limited to foreign investment until February 2001. 
22  Our rationale for this control is as follows. Firms are not selected for rights offerings on a random 
basis, but on the basis of firm characteristics. As noted earlier, rights offering firms are generally 
more profitable than other firms. Although observable firm factors such as profitability can be used 
to control for the effect of financial conditions on the tax expense, unobservable characteristics such 
as the management philosophy on tax obligations may also affect tax paid and thereby cause bias. 
If financially healthier firms generally pay more tax than randomly selected firms and this selectivity 
effect is ignored, then a comparison of the taxes paid by rights offering (i.e., high book incentive) 
firms versus non-rights offering (i.e., low book incentive) firms may bias the tax payment estimates 
for rights offering firms. Nevertheless, our main results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of 
this control variable. 
23  To implement the selection model successfully, Lennox et al. (2012) and Little (1985) suggest that 
the researcher must identify exogenous independent variables from the first-stage choice model that 
can be validly excluded from the set of independent variables in the second-stage regression. Hence, 
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audit opinion is a good choice as an exclusion restriction. During our sample period, an average of 
9.7 percent of firms receive non-clean (modified) opinions. The severity of modified opinions also 
varies from unqualified with explanatory notes (5.7 percent) and qualified (3.2 percent) opinions to 
disclaimer and adverse opinions (0.8 percent). Therefore, there appears to be sufficient variation in 
the frequency and type of opinion to make this instrument work. We find qualitatively similar 
results without imposing exclusion restrictions in the second-stage model. The first-stage regression 
model is significant (Pseudo R2 is 4.64 percent, p < 0.01). Untabulated results suggest that audit 
opinion has a significantly negative effect, indicating that firms with a qualified opinion are 
significantly less likely to apply for a rights issue than are unqualified firms. Further, while growing 
firms are more likely to apply for rights offerings, large firms, high-leverage firms, and government-
controlled firms are less likely to do so. 
24  Because each group of firms has homogenous book incentives across years and exhibits similar 
firm characteristics, there should be little selectivity effect. Hence, the model used for testing the 
second hypothesis does not include the IMR. 
25  None of the correlations or variance-inflation-factors (VIFs) exceeds 0.80 or 10, respectively, the 
points beyond which the threat of multicollinearity becomes a concern (Judge et al. 1988; Greene 
2008). 
26  We obtain qualitatively similar results if we pool all firm-year observations in Panels A and B by 
introducing a two-way interaction term (i.e., SIZE ∗ INCENTIVE) to the by-period regression models 
and a three-way interaction term (i.e., SIZE ∗ INCENTIVE ∗ POST98) to the full-period regression 
model. 
27  This is consistent with the definition employed by the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation 
(1984). Income adjusted for extraordinary items is a better measure of firm profitability, as many 
firms in China gain rights offering approval by recording excess non-operating income (Chen and 
Yuan 2004). 
28  Although not tabulated due to space limitations, we also rerun pooled regressions, in addition to 
the regression for firms with low book incentives reported in Table 4, and find qualitatively similar 
results. 
29  Prior studies find that Chinese rights-offering firms with earnings pressure tend to report a 
significant decline in post-offering earnings (Chen and Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005). To identify 
genuine earnings managers, we also analyze the ROE pattern in the two years preceding and the 
two years following the rights offering. We find that 109 firms' ROEs peak in the offering year and 
decline significantly thereafter, and that 14 firms exhibit high and stable ROEs over the entire period. 
We remove these 14 firms from the sample and find that INCENTIVE remains significantly positive 
in the pre-1998 period only, suggesting that our results are mainly driven by firms with strong 
incentives to inflate book income. 
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30  We also winsorize the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution to eliminate extremely high 
and low scaled tax expenses. These results (which are qualitatively similar to the main results) are 
not tabulated due to space limitations. 
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